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Abstract
Machine learning can impact people with legal or ethical consequences when
it is used to automate decisions in areas such as insurance, lending, hiring, and
predictive policing. In many of these scenarios, previous decisions have been made
that are unfairly biased against certain subpopulations, for example those of a
particular race, gender, or sexual orientation. Since this past data may be biased,
machine learning predictors must account for this to avoid perpetuating or creating
discriminatory practices. In this paper, we develop a framework for modeling
fairness using tools from causal inference. Our definition of counterfactual fairness
captures the intuition that a decision is fair towards an individual if it is the same in
(a) the actual world and (b) a counterfactual world where the individual belonged
to a different demographic group. We demonstrate our framework on a real-world
problem of fair prediction of success in law school.
1 Contribution
Machine learning has spread to fields as diverse as credit scoring [20], crime prediction [5], and loan
assessment [25]. Decisions in these areas may have ethical or legal implications, so it is necessary for
the modeler to think beyond the objective of maximizing prediction accuracy and consider the societal
impact of their work. For many of these applications, it is crucial to ask if the predictions of a model
are fair. Training data can contain unfairness for reasons having to do with historical prejudices or
other factors outside an individual’s control. In 2016, the Obama administration released a report2
which urged data scientists to analyze “how technologies can deliberately or inadvertently perpetuate,
exacerbate, or mask discrimination."
There has been much recent interest in designing algorithms that make fair predictions [4, 6, 10,
12, 14, 16–19, 22, 24, 36–39]. In large part, the literature has focused on formalizing fairness
into quantitative definitions and using them to solve a discrimination problem in a certain dataset.
Unfortunately, for a practitioner, law-maker, judge, or anyone else who is interested in implementing
algorithms that control for discrimination, it can be difficult to decide which definition of fairness to
choose for the task at hand. Indeed, we demonstrate that depending on the relationship between a
protected attribute and the data, certain definitions of fairness can actually increase discrimination.
∗Equal contribution. This work was done while JL was a Research Fellow at the Alan Turing Institute.
2https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/04/big-risks-big-opportunities-intersection-big-data-
and-civil-rights
31st Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2017), Long Beach, CA, USA.
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In this paper, we introduce the first explicitly causal approach to address fairness. Specifically, we
leverage the causal framework of Pearl [30] to model the relationship between protected attributes
and data. We describe how techniques from causal inference can be effective tools for designing fair
algorithms and argue, as in DeDeo [9], that it is essential to properly address causality in fairness. In
perhaps the most closely related prior work, Johnson et al. [15] make similar arguments but from a
non-causal perspective. An alternative use of causal modeling in the context of fairness is introduced
independently by [21].
In Section 2, we provide a summary of basic concepts in fairness and causal modeling. In Section 3,
we provide the formal definition of counterfactual fairness, which enforces that a distribution over
possible predictions for an individual should remain unchanged in a world where an individual’s
protected attributes had been different in a causal sense. In Section 4, we describe an algorithm to
implement this definition, while distinguishing it from existing approaches. In Section 5, we illustrate
the algorithm with a case of fair assessment of law school success.
2 Background
This section provides a basic account of two separate areas of research in machine learning, which
are formally unified in this paper. We suggest Berk et al. [1] and Pearl et al. [29] as references.
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notation. Let A denote the set of protected attributes
of an individual, variables that must not be discriminated against in a formal sense defined differently
by each notion of fairness discussed. The decision of whether an attribute is protected or not is taken
as a primitive in any given problem, regardless of the definition of fairness adopted. Moreover, let
X denote the other observable attributes of any particular individual, U the set of relevant latent
attributes which are not observed, and let Y denote the outcome to be predicted, which itself might
be contaminated with historical biases. Finally, Yˆ is the predictor, a random variable that depends on
A,X and U , and which is produced by a machine learning algorithm as a prediction of Y .
2.1 Fairness
There has been much recent work on fair algorithms. These include fairness through unawareness
[12], individual fairness [10, 16, 24, 38], demographic parity/disparate impact [36], and equality of
opportunity [14, 37]. For simplicity we often assume A is encoded as a binary attribute, but this can
be generalized.
Definition 1 (Fairness Through Unawareness (FTU)). An algorithm is fair so long as any protected
attributes A are not explicitly used in the decision-making process.
Any mapping Yˆ : X → Y that excludesA satisfies this. Initially proposed as a baseline, the approach
has found favor recently with more general approaches such as Grgic-Hlaca et al. [12]. Despite its
compelling simplicity, FTU has a clear shortcoming as elements of X can contain discriminatory
information analogous to A that may not be obvious at first. The need for expert knowledge in
assessing the relationship between A and X was highlighted in the work on individual fairness:
Definition 2 (Individual Fairness (IF)). An algorithm is fair if it gives similar predictions to similar
individuals. Formally, given a metric d(·, ·), if individuals i and j are similar under this metric (i.e.,
d(i, j) is small) then their predictions should be similar: Yˆ (X(i), A(i)) ≈ Yˆ (X(j), A(j)).
As described in [10], the metric d(·, ·) must be carefully chosen, requiring an understanding of the
domain at hand beyond black-box statistical modeling. This can also be contrasted against population
level criteria such as
Definition 3 (Demographic Parity (DP)). A predictor Yˆ satisfies demographic parity if P (Yˆ |A =
0) = P (Yˆ |A = 1).
Definition 4 (Equality of Opportunity (EO)). A predictor Yˆ satisfies equality of opportunity if
P (Yˆ = 1|A = 0, Y = 1) = P (Yˆ = 1|A = 1, Y = 1).
These criteria can be incompatible in general, as discussed in [1, 7, 22]. Following the motivation of
IF and [15], we propose that knowledge about relationships between all attributes should be taken
into consideration, even if strong assumptions are necessary. Moreover, it is not immediately clear
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for any of these approaches in which ways historical biases can be tackled. We approach such issues
from an explicit causal modeling perspective.
2.2 Causal Models and Counterfactuals
We follow Pearl [28], and define a causal model as a triple (U, V, F ) of sets such that
• U is a set of latent background variables,which are factors not caused by any variable in
the set V of observable variables;
• F is a set of functions {f1, . . . , fn}, one for each Vi ∈ V , such that Vi = fi(pai, Upai),
pai ⊆ V \{Vi} and Upai ⊆ U . Such equations are also known as structural equations [2].
The notation “pai” refers to the “parents” of Vi and is motivated by the assumption that the model
factorizes as a directed graph, here assumed to be a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The model is causal
in that, given a distribution P (U) over the background variables U , we can derive the distribution of a
subset Z ⊆ V following an intervention on V \Z. An intervention on variable Vi is the substitution
of equation Vi = fi(pai, Upai) with the equation Vi = v for some v. This captures the idea of an
agent, external to the system, modifying it by forcefully assigning value v to Vi, for example as in a
randomized experiment.
The specification of F is a strong assumption but allows for the calculation of counterfactual
quantities. In brief, consider the following counterfactual statement, “the value of Y if Z had taken
value z”, for two observable variables Z and Y . By assumption, the state of any observable variable is
fully determined by the background variables and structural equations. The counterfactual is modeled
as the solution for Y for a given U = u where the equations for Z are replaced with Z = z. We
denote it by YZ←z(u) [28], and sometimes as Yz if the context of the notation is clear.
Counterfactual inference, as specified by a causal model (U, V, F ) given evidence W , is the computa-
tion of probabilities P (YZ←z(U) |W =w), where W , Z and Y are subsets of V . Inference proceeds
in three steps, as explained in more detail in Chapter 4 of Pearl et al. [29]: 1. Abduction: for a given
prior on U , compute the posterior distribution of U given the evidence W = w; 2. Action: substitute
the equations for Z with the interventional values z, resulting in the modified set of equations Fz;
3. Prediction: compute the implied distribution on the remaining elements of V using Fz and the
posterior P (U |W = w).
3 Counterfactual Fairness
Given a predictive problem with fairness considerations, where A, X and Y represent the protected
attributes, remaining attributes, and output of interest respectively, let us assume that we are given a
causal model (U, V, F ), where V ≡ A ∪X . We postulate the following criterion for predictors of Y .
Definition 5 (Counterfactual fairness). Predictor Yˆ is counterfactually fair if under any context
X = x and A = a,
P (YˆA←a (U) = y | X = x,A = a) = P (YˆA←a′(U) = y | X = x,A = a), (1)
for all y and for any value a′ attainable by A.
This notion is closely related to actual causes [13], or token causality in the sense that, to be fair,
A should not be a cause of Yˆ in any individual instance. In other words, changing A while holding
things which are not causally dependent on A constant will not change the distribution of Yˆ . We also
emphasize that counterfactual fairness is an individual-level definition. This is substantially different
from comparing different individuals that happen to share the same “treatment” A = a and coincide
on the values of X , as discussed in Section 4.3.1 of [29] and the Supplementary Material. Differences
between Xa and Xa′ must be caused by variations on A only. Notice also that this definition is
agnostic with respect to how good a predictor Yˆ is, which we discuss in Section 4.
Relation to individual fairness. IF is agnostic with respect to its notion of similarity metric, which
is both a strength (generality) and a weakness (no unified way of defining similarity). Counterfactuals
and similarities are related, as in the classical notion of distances between “worlds” corresponding to
different counterfactuals [23]. If Yˆ is a deterministic function of W ⊂ A ∪X ∪ U , as in several of
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Figure 1: (a), (b) Two causal models for different real-world fair prediction scenarios. See Section 3.1
for discussion. (c) The graph corresponding to a causal model withA being the protected attribute and
Y some outcome of interest, with background variables assumed to be independent. (d) Expanding
the model to include an intermediate variable indicating whether the individual is employed with
two (latent) background variables Prejudiced (if the person offering the job is prejudiced) and
Qualifications (a measure of the individual’s qualifications). (e) A twin network representation of
this system [28] under two different counterfactual levels for A. This is created by copying nodes
descending from A, which inherit unaffected parents from the factual world.
our examples to follow, then IF can be defined by treating equally two individuals with the same W
in a way that is also counterfactually fair.
Relation to Pearl et al. [29]. In Example 4.4.4 of [29], the authors condition instead on X , A, and
the observed realization of Yˆ , and calculate the probability of the counterfactual realization YˆA←a′
differing from the factual. This example conflates the predictor Yˆ with the outcome Y , of which
we remain agnostic in our definition but which is used in the construction of Yˆ as in Section 4. Our
framing makes the connection to machine learning more explicit.
3.1 Examples
To provide an intuition for counterfactual fairness, we will consider two real-world fair prediction sce-
narios: insurance pricing and crime prediction. Each of these correspond to one of the two causal
graphs in Figure 1(a),(b). The Supplementary Material provides a more mathematical discussion of
these examples with more detailed insights.
Scenario 1: The Red Car. A car insurance company wishes to price insurance for car owners
by predicting their accident rate Y . They assume there is an unobserved factor corresponding to
aggressive driving U , that (a) causes drivers to be more likely have an accident, and (b) causes
individuals to prefer red cars (the observed variable X). Moreover, individuals belonging to a
certain race A are more likely to drive red cars. However, these individuals are no more likely to be
aggressive or to get in accidents than any one else. We show this in Figure 1(a). Thus, using the
red car feature X to predict accident rate Y would seem to be an unfair prediction because it may
charge individuals of a certain race more than others, even though no race is more likely to have an
accident. Counterfactual fairness agrees with this notion: changing A while holding U fixed will also
change X and, consequently, Yˆ . Interestingly, we can show (Supplementary Material) that in a linear
model, regressing Y on A and X is equivalent to regressing on U , so off-the-shelf regression here is
counterfactually fair. Regressing Y on X alone obeys the FTU criterion but is not counterfactually
fair, so omitting A (FTU) may introduce unfairness into an otherwise fair world.
Scenario 2: High Crime Regions. A city government wants to estimate crime rates by neighbor-
hood to allocate policing resources. Its analyst constructed training data by merging (1) a registry of
residents containing their neighborhood X and race A, with (2) police records of arrests, giving each
resident a binary label with Y = 1 indicating a criminal arrest record. Due to historically segregated
housing, the location X depends on A. Locations X with more police resources have larger numbers
of arrests Y . And finally, U represents the totality of socioeconomic factors and policing practices
that both influence where an individual may live and how likely they are to be arrested and charged.
This can all be seen in Figure 1(b).
In this example, higher observed arrest rates in some neighborhoods are due to greater policing there,
not because people of different races are any more or less likely to break the law. The label Y = 0
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does not mean someone has never committed a crime, but rather that they have not been caught. If
individuals in the training data have not already had equal opportunity, algorithms enforcing EO will
not remedy such unfairness. In contrast, a counterfactually fair approach would model differential
enforcement rates using U and base predictions on this information rather than on X directly.
In general, we need a multistage procedure in which we first derive latent variables U , and then based
on them we minimize some loss with respect to Y . This is the core of the algorithm discussed next.
3.2 Implications
One simple but important implication of the definition of counterfactual fairness is the following:
Lemma 1. Let G be the causal graph of the given model (U, V, F ). Then Yˆ will be counterfactually
fair if it is a function of the non-descendants of A.
Proof. Let W be any non-descendant of A in G. Then WA←a(U) and WA←a′(U) have the same
distribution by the three inferential steps in Section 2.2. Hence, the distribution of any function Yˆ of
the non-descendants of A is invariant with respect to the counterfactual values of A.
This does not exclude using a descendant W of A as a possible input to Yˆ . However, this will only
be possible in the case where the overall dependence of Yˆ on A disappears, which will not happen in
general. Hence, Lemma 1 provides the most straightforward way to achieve counterfactual fairness.
In some scenarios, it is desirable to define path-specific variations of counterfactual fairness that allow
for the inclusion of some descendants of A, as discussed by [21, 27] and the Supplementary Material.
Ancestral closure of protected attributes. Suppose that a parent of a member of A is not in A.
Counterfactual fairness allows for the use of it in the definition of Yˆ . If this seems counterintuitive,
then we argue that the fault should be at the postulated set of protected attributes rather than with the
definition of counterfactual fairness, and that typically we should expect set A to be closed under
ancestral relationships given by the causal graph. For instance, if Race is a protected attribute, and
Mother’s race is a parent of Race, then it should also be in A.
Dealing with historical biases and an existing fairness paradox. The explicit difference between
Yˆ and Y allows us to tackle historical biases. For instance, let Y be an indicator of whether a client
defaults on a loan, while Yˆ is the actual decision of giving the loan. Consider the DAG A → Y ,
shown in Figure 1(c) with the explicit inclusion of set U of independent background variables. Y is
the objectively ideal measure for decision making, the binary indicator of the event that the individual
defaults on a loan. IfA is postulated to be a protected attribute, then the predictor Yˆ = Y = fY (A,U)
is not counterfactually fair, with the arrow A → Y being (for instance) the result of a world that
punishes individuals in a way that is out of their control. Figure 1(d) shows a finer-grained model,
where the path is mediated by a measure of whether the person is employed, which is itself caused
by two background factors: one representing whether the person hiring is prejudiced, and the other
the employee’s qualifications. In this world, A is a cause of defaulting, even if mediated by other
variables3. The counterfactual fairness principle however forbids us from using Y : using the twin
network 4 of Pearl [28], we see in Figure 1(e) that Ya and Ya′ need not be identically distributed
given the background variables.
In contrast, any function of variables not descendants of A can be used a basis for fair decision
making. This means that any variable Yˆ defined by Yˆ = g(U) will be counterfactually fair for any
function g(·). Hence, given a causal model, the functional defined by the function g(·) minimizing
some predictive error for Y will satisfy the criterion, as proposed in Section 4.1. We are essentially
learning a projection of Y into the space of fair decisions, removing historical biases as a by-product.
Counterfactual fairness also provides an answer to some problems on the incompatibility of fairness
criteria. In particular, consider the following problem raised independently by different authors (e.g.,
3For example, if the function determining employment fE(A,P,Q) ≡ I(Q>0,P=0 orA 6=a) then an individual
with sufficient qualifications and prejudiced potential employer may have a different counterfactual employment
value for A = a compared to A = a′, and a different chance of default.
4In a nutshell, this is a graph that simultaneously depicts “multiple worlds” parallel to the factual realizations.
In this graph, all multiple worlds share the same background variables, but with different consequences in the
remaining variables depending on which counterfactual assignments are provided.
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[7, 22]), illustrated below for the binary case: ideally, we would like our predictors to obey both
Equality of Opportunity and the predictive parity criterion defined by satisfying
P (Y = 1 | Yˆ = 1, A = 1) = P (Y = 1 | Yˆ = 1, A = 0),
as well as the corresponding equation for Yˆ = 0. It has been shown that if Y and A are marginally
associated (e.g., recidivism and race are associated) and Y is not a deterministic function of Yˆ ,
then the two criteria cannot be reconciled. Counterfactual fairness throws a light in this scenario,
suggesting that both EO and predictive parity may be insufficient if Y and A are associated: assuming
that A and Y are unconfounded (as expected for demographic attributes), this is the result of A being
a cause of Y . By counterfactual fairness, we should not want to use Y as a basis for our decisions,
instead aiming at some function Y⊥A of variables which are not caused by A but are predictive of Y .
Yˆ is defined in such a way that is an estimate of the “closest” Y⊥A to Y according to some preferred
risk function. This makes the incompatibility between EO and predictive parity irrelevant, as A and
Y⊥A will be independent by construction given the model assumptions.
4 Implementing Counterfactual Fairness
As discussed in the previous Section, we need to relate Yˆ to Y if the predictor is to be useful, and we
restrict Yˆ to be a (parameterized) function of the non-descendants of A in the causal graph following
Lemma 1. We next introduce an algorithm, then discuss assumptions that can be used to express
counterfactuals.
4.1 Algorithm
Let Yˆ ≡ gθ(U,XA) be a predictor parameterized by θ, such as a logistic regression or a neural
network, and where XA ⊆ X are non-descendants of A. Given a loss function l(·, ·) such as
squared loss or log-likelihood, and training data D ≡ {(A(i), X(i), Y (i))} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we
define L(θ) ≡ ∑ni=1 E[l(y(i), gθ(U (i), x(i)A)) | x(i), a(i)]/n as the empirical loss to be minimized
with respect to θ. Each expectation is with respect to random variable U (i) ∼ PM(U | x(i), a(i))
where PM(U | x, a) is the conditional distribution of the background variables as given by a causal
model M that is available by assumption. If this expectation cannot be calculated analytically,
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) can be used to approximate it as in the following algorithm.
1: procedure FAIRLEARNING(D,M) . Learned parameters θˆ
2: For each data point i ∈ D, sample m MCMC samples U (i)1 , . . . , U (i)m ∼ PM(U | x(i), a(i)).
3: Let D′ be the augmented dataset where each point (a(i), x(i), y(i)) in D is replaced with the
corresponding m points {(a(i), x(i), y(i), u(i)j )}.
4: θˆ ← argminθ
∑
i′∈D′ l(y
(i′), gθ(U
(i′), x
(i′)
A)).
5: end procedure
At prediction time, we report Y˜ ≡ E[Yˆ (U?, x?A) | x?, a?] for a new data point (a?, x?).
Deconvolution perspective. The algorithm can be understood as a deconvolution approach that,
given observables A ∪X , extracts its latent sources and pipelines them into a predictive model. We
advocate that counterfactual assumptions must underlie all approaches that claim to extract the
sources of variation of the data as “fair” latent components. As an example, Louizos et al. [24] start
from the DAGA→ X ← U to extract P (U |X,A). As U andA are not independent givenX in this
representation, a type of penalization is enforced to create a posterior Pfair(U |A,X) that is close
to the model posterior P (U | A,X) while satisfying Pfair(U |A = a,X) ≈ Pfair(U |A = a′, X).
But this is neither necessary nor sufficient for counterfactual fairness. The model for X given A
and U must be justified by a causal mechanism, and that being the case, P (U | A,X) requires no
postprocessing. As a matter of fact, modelM can be learned by penalizing empirical dependence
measures between U and pai for a given Vi (e.g. Mooij et al. [26]), but this concernsM and not Yˆ ,
and is motivated by explicit assumptions about structural equations, as described next.
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4.2 Designing the Input Causal Model
ModelM must be provided to algorithm FAIRLEARNING. Although this is well understood, it is
worthwhile remembering that causal models always require strong assumptions, even more so when
making counterfactual claims [8]. Counterfactuals assumptions such as structural equations are in
general unfalsifiable even if interventional data for all variables is available. This is because there
are infinitely many structural equations compatible with the same observable distribution [28], be it
observational or interventional. Having passed testable implications, the remaining components of a
counterfactual model should be understood as conjectures formulated according to the best of our
knowledge. Such models should be deemed provisional and prone to modifications if, for example,
new data containing measurement of variables previously hidden contradict the current model.
We point out that we do not need to specify a fully deterministic model, and structural equations can
be relaxed as conditional distributions. In particular, the concept of counterfactual fairness holds
under three levels of assumptions of increasing strength:
Level 1. Build Yˆ using only the observable non-descendants of A. This only requires partial
causal ordering and no further causal assumptions, but in many problems there will be few, if any,
observables which are not descendants of protected demographic factors.
Level 2. Postulate background latent variables that act as non-deterministic causes of observable
variables, based on explicit domain knowledge and learning algorithms5. Information about X is
passed to Yˆ via P (U | x, a).
Level 3. Postulate a fully deterministic model with latent variables. For instance, the distribution
P (Vi | pai) can be treated as an additive error model, Vi=fi(pai)+ei [31]. The error term ei then
becomes an input to Yˆ as calculated from the observed variables. This maximizes the information
extracted by the fair predictor Yˆ .
4.3 Further Considerations on Designing the Input Causal Model
One might ask what we can lose by defining causal fairness measures involving only non-
counterfactual causal quantities, such as enforcing P (Yˆ = 1 | do(A = a)) = P (Yˆ = 1 | do(A = a′))
instead of our counterfactual criterion. The reason is that the above equation is only a constraint
on an average effect. Obeying this criterion provides no guarantees against, for example, having
half of the individuals being strongly “negatively” discriminated and half of the individuals strongly
“positively” discriminated. We advocate that, for fairness, society should not be satisfied in pursuing
only counterfactually-free guarantees. While one may be willing to claim posthoc that the equation
above masks no balancing effect so that individuals receive approximately the same distribution of
outcomes, that itself is just a counterfactual claim in disguise. Our approach is to make counterfactual
assumptions explicit. When unfairness is judged to follow only some “pathways” in the causal graph
(in a sense that can be made formal, see [21, 27]), nonparametric assumptions about the independence
of counterfactuals may suffice, as discussed by [27]. In general, nonparametric assumptions may not
provide identifiable adjustments even in this case, as also discussed in our Supplementary Material.
If competing models with different untestable assumptions are available, there are ways of simultane-
ously enforcing a notion of approximate counterfactual fairness in all of them, as introduced by us in
[32]. Other alternatives include exploiting bounds on the contribution of hidden variables [29, 33].
Another issue is the interpretation of causal claims involving demographic variables such as race
and sex. Our view is that such constructs are the result of translating complex events into random
variables and, despite some controversy, we consider counterproductive to claim that e.g. race and sex
cannot be causes. An idealized intervention on some A at a particular time can be seen as a notational
shortcut to express a conjunction of more specific interventions, which may be individually doable
but jointly impossible in practice. It is the plausibility of complex, even if impossible to practically
manipulate, causal chains fromA to Y that allows us to claim that unfairness is real [11]. Experiments
for constructs exist, such as randomizing names in job applications to make them race-blind. They do
not contradict the notion of race as a cause, and can be interpreted as an intervention on a particular
aspect of the construct “race,” such as “race perception” (e.g. Section 4.4.4 of [29]).
5In some domains, it is actually common to build a model entirely around latent constructs with few or no
observable parents nor connections among observed variables [2].
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5 Illustration: Law School Success
We illustrate our approach on a practical problem that requires fairness, the prediction of success in
law school. A second problem, understanding the contribution of race to police stops, is described in
the Supplementary Material. Following closely the usual framework for assessing causal models in
the machine learning literature, the goal of this experiment is to quantify how our algorithm behaves
with finite sample sizes while assuming ground truth compatible with a synthetic model.
Problem definition: Law school success
The Law School Admission Council conducted a survey across 163 law schools in the United States
[35]. It contains information on 21,790 law students such as their entrance exam scores (LSAT), their
grade-point average (GPA) collected prior to law school, and their first year average grade (FYA).
Given this data, a school may wish to predict if an applicant will have a high FYA. The school would
also like to make sure these predictions are not biased by an individual’s race and sex. However, the
LSAT, GPA, and FYA scores, may be biased due to social factors. We compare our framework with
two unfair baselines: 1. Full: the standard technique of using all features, including sensitive features
such as race and sex to make predictions; 2. Unaware: fairness through unawareness, where we
do not use race and sex as features. For comparison, we generate predictors Yˆ for all models using
logistic regression.
Fair prediction. As described in Section 4.2, there are three ways in which we can model a
counterfactually fair predictor of FYA. Level 1 uses any features which are not descendants of race
and sex for prediction. Level 2 models latent ‘fair’ variables which are parents of observed variables.
These variables are independent of both race and sex. Level 3 models the data using an additive error
model, and uses the independent error terms to make predictions. These models make increasingly
strong assumptions corresponding to increased predictive power. We split the dataset 80/20 into a
train/test set, preserving label balance, to evaluate the models.
As we believe LSAT, GPA, and FYA are all biased by race and sex, we cannot use any observed
features to construct a counterfactually fair predictor as described in Level 1.
In Level 2, we postulate that a latent variable: a student’s knowledge (K), affects GPA, LSAT, and
FYA scores. The causal graph corresponding to this model is shown in Figure 2, (Level 2). This is a
short-hand for the distributions:
GPA ∼ N (bG + wKGK + wRGR+ wSGS, σG), FYA ∼ N (wKF K + wRFR+ wSFS, 1),
LSAT ∼ Poisson(exp(bL + wKLK + wRLR+ wSLS)), K ∼ N (0, 1)
We perform inference on this model using an observed training set to estimate the posterior distribution
of K. We use the probabilistic programming language Stan [34] to learn K. We call the predictor
constructed using K, Fair K.
Know
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Figure 2: Left: A causal model for the problem of predicting law school success fairly. Right:
Density plots of predicted FYAa and FYAa′ .
In Level 3, we model GPA, LSAT, and FYA as continuous variables with additive error terms
independent of race and sex (that may in turn be correlated with one-another). This model is shown
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Table 1: Prediction results using logistic regression. Note that we must sacrifice a small amount of
accuracy to ensuring counterfactually fair prediction (Fair K, Fair Add), versus the models that use
unfair features: GPA, LSAT, race, sex (Full, Unaware).
Full Unaware Fair K Fair Add
RMSE 0.873 0.894 0.929 0.918
in Figure 2, (Level 3), and is expressed by:
GPA = bG + wRGR+ w
S
GS + G, G ∼ p(G)
LSAT = bL + wRLR+ w
S
LS + L, L ∼ p(L)
FYA = bF + wRFR+ w
S
FS + F , F ∼ p(F )
We estimate the error terms G, L by first fitting two models that each use race and sex to individually
predict GPA and LSAT. We then compute the residuals of each model (e.g., G=GPA−YˆGPA(R,S)).
We use these residual estimates of G, L to predict FYA. We call this Fair Add.
Accuracy. We compare the RMSE achieved by logistic regression for each of the models on the test
set in Table 1. The Full model achieves the lowest RMSE as it uses race and sex to more accurately
reconstruct FYA. Note that in this case, this model is not fair even if the data was generated by one of
the models shown in Figure 2 as it corresponds to Scenario 3. The (also unfair) Unaware model still
uses the unfair variables GPA and LSAT, but because it does not use race and sex it cannot match the
RMSE of the Full model. As our models satisfy counterfactual fairness, they trade off some accuracy.
Our first model Fair K uses weaker assumptions and thus the RMSE is highest. Using the Level 3
assumptions, as in Fair Add we produce a counterfactually fair model that trades slightly stronger
assumptions for lower RMSE.
Counterfactual fairness. We would like to empirically test whether the baseline methods are
counterfactually fair. To do so we will assume the true model of the world is given by Figure 2,
(Level 2). We can fit the parameters of this model using the observed data and evaluate counterfactual
fairness by sampling from it. Specifically, we will generate samples from the model given either
the observed race and sex, or counterfactual race and sex variables. We will fit models to both the
original and counterfactual sampled data and plot how the distribution of predicted FYA changes for
both baseline models. Figure 2 shows this, where each row corresponds to a baseline predictor and
each column corresponds to the counterfactual change. In each plot, the blue distribution is density of
predicted FYA for the original data and the red distribution is this density for the counterfactual data. If
a model is counterfactually fair we would expect these distributions to lie exactly on top of each other.
Instead, we note that the Full model exhibits counterfactual unfairness for all counterfactuals except
sex. We see a similar trend for the Unaware model, although it is closer to being counterfactually
fair. To see why these models seem to be fair w.r.t. to sex we can look at weights of the DAG which
generates the counterfactual data. Specifically the DAG weights from (male,female) to GPA are
(0.93,1.06) and from (male,female) to LSAT are (1.1,1.1). Thus, these models are fair w.r.t. to sex
simply because of a very weak causal link between sex and GPA/LSAT.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a new model of fairness we refer to as counterfactual fairness. It allows us
to propose algorithms that, rather than simply ignoring protected attributes, are able to take into
account the different social biases that may arise towards individuals based on ethically sensitive
attributes and compensate for these biases effectively. We experimentally contrasted our approach
with previous fairness approaches and show that our explicit causal models capture these social biases
and make clear the implicit trade-off between prediction accuracy and fairness in an unfair world. We
propose that fairness should be regulated by explicitly modeling the causal structure of the world.
Criteria based purely on probabilistic independence cannot satisfy this and are unable to address how
unfairness is occurring in the task at hand. By providing such causal tools for addressing fairness
questions we hope we can provide practitioners with customized techniques for solving a wide array
of fairness modeling problems.
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S1 Population Level vs Individual Level Causal Effects
As discussed in Section 3, counterfactual fairness is an individual-level definition. This is funda-
mentally different from comparing different units that happen to share the same “treatment” A = a
and coincide on the values of X . To see in detail what this means, consider the following thought
experiment.
Let us assess the causal effect of A on Yˆ by controlling A at two levels, a and a′. In Pearl’s notation,
where “do(A = a)” expresses an intervention on A at level a, we have that
E[Yˆ | do(A = a), X = x]− E[Yˆ | do(A = a′), X = x], (2)
is a measure of causal effect, sometimes called the average causal effect (ACE). It expresses the
change that is expected when we intervene on A while observing the attribute set X = x, under two
levels of treatment. If this effect is non-zero, A is considered to be a cause of Yˆ .
This raises a subtlety that needs to be addressed: in general, this effect will be non-zero even if Yˆ is
counterfactually fair. This may sound counter-intuitive: protected attributes such as race and gender
are causes of our counterfactually fair decisions.
In fact, this is not a contradiction, as the ACE in Equation (2) is different from counterfactual effects.
The ACE contrasts two independent exchangeable units of the population, and it is a perfectly
valid way of performing decision analysis. However, the value of X = x is affected by different
background variables corresponding to different individuals. That is, the causal effect (2) contrasts
two units that receive different treatments but which happen to coincide onX = x. To give a synthetic
example, imagine the simple structural equation
X = A+ U.
The ACE quantifies what happens among people with U = x− a against people with U ′ = x− a′.
If, for instance, Yˆ = λU for λ 6= 0, then the effect (2) is λ(a− a′) 6= 0.
Contrary to that, the counterfactual difference is zero. That is,
E[YˆA←a(U) | A = a,X = x]− E[YˆA←a′(U) | A = a,X = x] = λU − λU = 0.
In another perspective, we can interpret the above just as if we had measured U from the beginning
rather than performing abduction. We then generate Yˆ from some g(U), so U is the within-unit cause
of Yˆ and not A.
If U cannot be deterministically derived from {A = a,X = x}, the reasoning is similar. By
abduction, the distribution of U will typically depend on A, and hence so will Yˆ when marginalizing
over U . Again, this seems to disagree with the intuition that our predictor should be not be caused by
A. However, this once again is a comparison across individuals, not within an individual.
It is this balance among (A,X,U) that explains, in the examples of Section 3.1, why some predictors
are counterfactually fair even though they are functions of the same variables {A,X} used by unfair
predictors: such functions must correspond to particular ways of balancing the observables that, by
way of the causal assumptions, cancel out the effect of A.
More on conditioning and alternative definitions. As discussed in Example 4.4.4 of Pearl et al.
[29], a different proposal for assessing fairness can be defined via the following concept:
Definition 6 (Probability of sufficiency). We define the probability of event {A = a} being a
sufficient cause for our decision Yˆ , contrasted against {A = a′}, as
P (YˆA←a′ (U) 6= y | X = x,A = a, Yˆ = y). (3)
We can then, for instance, claim that Yˆ is a fair predictor if this probability is below some pre-specified
bound for all (x, a, a′). The shortcomings of this definition come from its original motivation: to
explain the behavior of an existing decision protocol, where Yˆ is the current practice and which in
a unclear way is conflated with Y . The implication is that if Yˆ is to be designed instead of being a
natural measure of existing behaviour, then we are using Yˆ itself as evidence for the background
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variables U . This does not make sense if Yˆ is yet to be designed by us. If Yˆ is to be interpreted as Y ,
then this does not provide a clear recipe on how to build Yˆ : while we can use Y to learn a causal
model, we cannot use it to collect training data evidence for U as the outcome Y will not be available
to us at prediction time. For this reason, we claim that while probability of sufficiency is useful as a
way of assessing an existing decision making process, it is not as natural as counterfactual fairness in
the context of machine learning.
Approximate fairness and model validation. The notion of probability of sufficiency raises the
question on how to define approximate, or high probability, counterfactual fairness. This is an
important question that we address in [32]. Before defining an approximation, it is important to first
expose in detail what the exact definition is, which is the goal of this paper.
We also do not address the validation of the causal assumptions used by the input causal model of the
FAIRLEARNING algorithm in Section 4.1. The reason is straightforward: this validation is an entirely
self-contained step of the implementation of counterfactual fairness. An extensive literature already
exists in this topic which the practitioner can refer to (a classic account for instance is [3]), and which
can be used as-is in our context.
The experiments performed in Section 5 can be criticized by the fact that they rely on a model
that obeys our assumptions, and “obviously” our approach should work better than alternatives.
This criticism is not warranted: in machine learning, causal inference is typically assessed through
simulations which assume that the true model lies in the family covered by the algorithm. Algorithms,
including FAIRLEARNING, are justified in the population sense. How different competitors behave
with finite sample sizes is the primary question to be studied in an empirical study of a new concept,
where we control for the correctness of the assumptions. Although sensitivity analysis is important,
there are many degrees of freedom on how this can be done. Robustness issues are better addressed
by extensions focusing on approximate versions of counterfactual fairness. This will be covered in
later work.
Stricter version. For completeness of exposition, notice that the definition of counterfactual fairness
could be strengthened to
P (YˆA←a(U) = YˆA←a′(U) | X = x,A = a) = 1. (4)
This is different from the original definition in the case where Yˆ (U) is a random variable with a
different source of randomness for different counterfactuals (for instance, if Yˆ is given by some
black-box function of U with added noise that is independent across each countefactual value of
A). In such a situation, the event {YˆA←a(U) = YˆA←a′(U)} will itself have probability zero even
if P (YˆA←a(U) = y | X = x,A = a) = P (YˆA←a′(U) = y | X = x,A = a) for all y. We do not
consider version (4) as in our view it does not feel as elegant as the original, and it is also unclear
whether adding an independent source of randomness fed to Yˆ would itself be considered unfair.
Moreover, if Yˆ (U) is assumed to be a deterministic function of U and X , as in FAIRLEARNING,
then the two definitions are the same6. Informally, this stricter definition corresponds to a notion
of “almost surely equality” as opposed to “equality in distribution.” Without assuming that Yˆ is a
deterministic function of U and X , even the stricter version does not protect us against measure zero
events where the counterfactuals are different. The definition of counterfactual fairness concisely
emphasizes that U can be a random variable, and clarifies which conditional distribution it follows.
Hence, it is our preferred way of introducing the concept even though it does not explicit suggests
whether Yˆ (U) has random inputs besides U .
S2 Relation to Demographic Parity
Consider the graph A → X → Y . In general, if Yˆ is a function of X only, then Yˆ need not obey
demographic parity, i.e.
P (Yˆ | A = a) 6= P (Yˆ | A = a′),
6Notice that Yˆ (U) is itself a random variable if U is, but the source of randomness, U , is the same across all
counterfactuals.
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where, since Yˆ is a function of X , the probabilities are obtained by marginalizing over P (X | A = a)
and P (X | A = a′), respectively.
If we postulate a structural equation X = αA+ eX , then given A and X we can deduce eX . If Yˆ is
a function of eX only and, by assumption, eX is marginally independent of A, then Yˆ is marginally
independent of A: this follows the interpretation given in the previous section, where we interpret eX
as “known” despite being mathematically deduced from the observation (A = a,X = x). Therefore,
the assumptions imply that Yˆ will satisfy demographic parity, and that can be falsified. By way
of contrast, if eX is not uniquely identifiable from the structural equation and (A,X), then the
distribution of Yˆ depends on the value of A as we marginalize eX , and demographic parity will not
follow. This leads to the following:
Lemma 2. If all background variables U ′ ⊆ U in the definition of Yˆ are determined from A and X ,
and all observable variables in the definition of Yˆ are independent of A given U ′, then Yˆ satisfies
demographic parity.
Thus, counterfactual fairness can be thought of as a counterfactual analog of demographic parity, as
present in the Red Car example further discussed in the next section.
S3 Examples Revisited
In Section 3.1, we discussed two examples. We reintroduce them here briefly, add a third example, and
explain some consequences of their causal structure to the design of counterfactually fair predictors.
Scenario 1: The Red Car Revisited. In that scenario, the structure A → X ← U → Y implies
that Yˆ should not use either X or A. On the other hand, it is acceptable to use U . It is interesting to
realize, however, that since U is related to A and X , there will be some association between Y and
{A,X} as discussed in Section S1. In particular, if the structural equation for X is linear, then U is
a linear function of A and X , and as such Yˆ will also be a function of both A and X . This is not
a problem, as it is still the case that the model implies that this is merely a functional dependence
that disappears by conditioning on a postulated latent attribute U . Surprisingly, we must make Yˆ a
indirect function of A if we want a counterfactually fair predictor, as shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a linear model with the structure in Figure 1(a). Fitting a linear predictor to X
only is not counterfactually fair, while the same algorithm will produce a fair predictor using both A
and X .
Proof. As in the definition, we will consider the population case, where the joint distribution is
known. Consider the case where the equations described by the model in Figure 1(a) are deterministic
and linear:
X = αA+ βU, Y = γU.
Denote the variance of U as vU , the variance of A as vA, and assume all coefficients are non-zero.
The predictor Yˆ (X) defined by least-squares regression of Y on only X is given by Yˆ (X) ≡ λX ,
where λ = Cov(X,Y )/V ar(X)=βγvU/(α2vA + β2vU ) 6= 0. This predictor follows the concept
of fairness through unawareness.
We can test whether a predictor Yˆ is counterfactually fair by using the procedure described in
Section 2.2:
(i) Compute U given observations of X,Y,A; (ii) Substitute the equations involving A with an
interventional value a′; (iii) Compute the variables X,Y with the interventional value a′. It is clear
here that Yˆa(U)=λ(αa+ βU) 6= Yˆa′(U). This predictor is not counterfactually fair. Thus, in this
case fairness through unawareness actually perpetuates unfairness.
Consider instead doing least-squares regression of Y onX and A. Note that Yˆ (X,A) ≡ λXX+λAA
where λX , λA can be derived as follows:
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(
λX
λA
)
=
(
V ar(X) Cov(A,X)
Cov(X,A) V ar(A)
)−1(
Cov(X,Y )
Cov(A, Y )
)
=
1
β2vUvA
(
vA −αvA
−αvA α2vA + β2vU
)(
βγvU
0
)
=
( γ
β−αγ
β
)
(5)
Now imagine we have observed A = a. This implies that X = αa + βU and our predictor is
Yˆ (X, a) = γβ (αa+βU)+
−αγ
β a = γU . Thus, if we substitute a with a counterfactual a
′ (the action
step described in Section 2.2) the predictor Yˆ (X,A) is unchanged. This is because our predictor is
constructed in such a way that any change in X caused by a change in A is cancelled out by the λA.
Thus this predictor is counterfactually fair.
Note that if Figure 1(a) is the true model for the real world then Yˆ (X,A) will also satisfy demographic
parity and equality of opportunity as Yˆ will be unaffected by A.
The above lemma holds in a more general case for the structure given in Figure 1(a): any non-constant
estimator that depends only on X is not counterfactually fair as changing A always alters X .
Scenario 2: High Crime Regions Revisited. The causal structure differs from the previous exam-
ple by the extra edge X → Y . For illustration purposes, assume again that the model is linear. Unlike
the previous case, a predictor Yˆ trained using X and A is not counterfactually fair. The only change
from Scenario 1 is that now Y depends on X as follows: Y =γU + θX . Now if we solve for λX , λA
it can be shown that Yˆ (X, a)=(γ − α2θvAβvU )U + αθa. As this predictor depends on the values of A
that are not explained by U , then Yˆ (X, a) 6= Yˆ (X, a′) and thus Yˆ (X,A) is not counterfactually fair.
The following extra example complements the previous two examples.
Scenario 3: University Success. A university wants to know if students will be successful post-
graduation Y . They have information such as: grade point average (GPA), advanced placement
(AP) exams results, and other academic features X . The university believes however, that an
individual’s gender A may influence these features and their post-graduation success Y due to social
discrimination. They also believe that independently, an individual’s latent talent U causes X and Y .
The structure is similar to Figure 1(a), with the extra edge A→ Y . We can again ask, is the predictor
Yˆ (X,A) counterfactually fair? In this case, the different between this and Scenario 1 is that Y is
a function of U and A as follows: Y = γU + ηA. We can again solve for λX , λA and show that
Yˆ (X, a)=(γ − αηvAβvU )U + ηa. Again Yˆ (X,A) is a function of A not explained by U , so it cannot
be counterfactually fair.
S4 Analysis of Individual Pathways
By way of an example, consider the following adaptation of the scenario concerning claims of
gender bias in UC Berkeley’s admission process in the 1970s, commonly used a textbook example
of Simpson’s Paradox. For each candidate student’s application, we have A as a binary indicator
of whether the applicant is female, X as the choice of course to apply for, and Y a binary indicator
of whether the application was successful or not. Let us postulate the causal graph that includes
the edges A → X and X → Y only. We observe that A and Y are negatively associated, which
in first instance might suggest discrimination, as gender is commonly accepted here as a protected
attribute for college admission. However, in the postulated model it turns out that A and Y are
causally independent given X . More specifically, women tend to choose more competitive courses
(those with higher rejection rate) than men when applying. Our judgment is that the higher rejection
among female than male applicants is acceptable, if the mechanism A→ X is interpreted as a choice
which is under the control of the applicant. That is, free-will overrides whatever possible cultural
background conditions that led to this discrepancy. In the framework of counterfactual fairness, we
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could claim that A is not a protected attribute to begin with once we understand how the world
works, and that including A in the predictor of success is irrelevant anyway once we include X in the
classifier.
However, consider the situation where there is an edge A→ Y , interpreted purely as the effect of
discrimination after causally controlling for X . While it is now reasonable to postulate A to be a
protected attribute, we can still judge thatX is not an unfair outcome: there is no need to “deconvolve”
A out of X to obtain an estimate of the other causes UX in the A→ X mechanism. This suggests
a simple modification of the definition of counterfactual fairness. First, given the causal graph G
assumed to encode the causal relationships in our system, define PGA as the set of all directed paths
from A to Y in G which are postulated to correspond to all unfair chains of events where A causes Y .
Let XPcGA ⊆ X be the subset of covariates not present in any path in PGA . Also, for any vector x, let
xs represent the corresponding subvector indexed by S. The corresponding uppercase version XS is
used for random vectors.
Definition 7 ((Path-dependent) counterfactual fairness). Predictor Yˆ is (path-dependent) counter-
factually fair with respect to path set PGA if under any context X = x and A = a,
P (YˆA←a,XPcGA← xP
c
GA
(U) = y | X = x,A = a) =
P (YˆA←a′,X 6PcGA← xP
c
GA
(U) = y | X = x,A = a), (6)
for all y and for any value a′ attainable by A.
This notion is related to controlled direct effects [29], where we intervene on some paths from A to
Y , but not others. Paths in PGA are considered here to be the “direct” paths, and we condition on X
and A similarly to the definition of probability of sufficiency (3). This definition is the same as the
original counterfactual fairness definition for the case where PcGA = ∅. Its interpretation is analogous
to the original, indicating that for any X0 ∈ XPcGA we are allowed to propagate information from the
factual assigment A = a, along with what we learned about the background causes UX0 , in order to
reconstruct X0. The contribution of A is considered acceptable in this case and does not need to be
“deconvolved.” The implication is that any member of X6PcGA can be included in the definition of Yˆ .
In the example of college applications, we are allowed to use the choice of course X even though A
is a confounder for X and Y . We are still not allowed to use A directly, bypassing the background
variables.
As discussed by [27], there are some counterfactual manipulations usable in a causal definition of
fairness that can be performed by exploiting only independence constraints among the counterfactuals:
that is, without requiring the explicit description of structural equations or other models for latent
variables. A contrast between the two approaches is left for future work, although we stress that they
are in some sense complementary: we are motivated mostly by problems such as the one in Figure
1(d), where many of the mediators themselves are considered to be unfairly affected by the protected
attribute, and independence constraints among counterfactuals alone are less likely to be useful in
identifying constraints for the fitting of a fair predictor.
S5 The Multifaceted Dynamics of Fairness
One particularly interesting question was raised by one of the reviewers: what is the effect of
continuing discrimination after fair decisions are made? For instance, consider the case where banks
enforce a fair allocation of loans for business owners regardless of, say, gender. This does not mean
such businesses will thrive at a balanced rate if customers continue to avoid female owned business at
a disproportionate rate for unfair reasons. Is there anything useful that can be said about this issue
from a causal perspective?
The work here proposed regards only what we can influence by changing how machine learning-
aided decision making takes place at specific problems. It cannot change directly how society as a
whole carry on with their biases. Ironically, it may sound unfair to banks to enforce the allocation
of resources to businesses at a rate that does not correspond to the probability of their respective
success, even if the owners of the corresponding businesses are not to be blamed by that. One way of
conciliating the different perspectives is by modeling how a fair allocation of loans, even if it does
not come without a cost, can nevertheless increase the proportion of successful female businesses
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Figure 3: A causal model for the stop and frisk dataset.
compared to the current baseline. This change can by itself have an indirect effect on the culture and
behavior of a society, leading to diminishing continuing discrimination by a feedback mechanism, as
in affirmative action. We believe that in the long run isolated acts of fairness are beneficial even if
we do not have direct control on all sources of unfairness in any specific problem. Causal modeling
can help on creating arguments about the long run impact of individual contributions as e.g. a type
of macroeconomic assessment. There are many challenges, and we should not pretend that precise
answers can be obtained, but in theory we should aim at educated quantitative assessments validating
how a systemic improvement in society can emerge from localized ways of addressing fairness.
S6 Case Study: NYC Stop-and-Frisk Data
Since 2002, the New York Police Department (NYPD) has recorded information about every time
a police officer has stopped someone. The officer records information such as if the person was
searched or frisked, if a weapon was found, their appearance, whether an arrest was made or a
summons issued, if force was used, etc. We consider the data collected on males stopped during
2014 which constitutes 38,609 records. We limit our analysis to looking at just males stopped as this
accounts for more than 90% of the data. We fit a model which postulates that police interactions is
caused by race and a single latent factor labeled Criminality that is meant to index other aspects of
the individual that have been used by the police and which are independent of race. We do not claim
that this model has a solid theoretical basis, we use it below as an illustration on how to carry on an
analysis of counterfactually fair decisions. We also describe a spatial analysis of the estimated latent
factors.
Model. We model this stop-and-frisk data using the graph in Figure 3. Specifically, we posit main
causes for the observations: Arrest (if an individual was arrested), Force (some sort of force was
used during the stop), Frisked, and Searched. The first cause of these observations is some measure
of an individual’s latent Criminality, which we do not observe. We believe that Criminality also
directly affects Weapon (an individual was found to be carrying a weapon). For all of the features
previously mentioned we believe there is an additional cause, an individual’s Race which we do
observe. This factor is introduced as we believe that these observations may be biased based on an
officer’s perception of whether an individual is likely a criminal or not, affected by an individual’s
Race. Thus note that, in this model, Criminality is counterfactually fair for the prediction of any
characteristic of the individual for problems where Race is a protected attribute.
Visualization on a map of New York City. Each of the stops can be mapped to longitude and
latitude points for where the stop occurred7. This allows us to visualize the distribution of two distinct
populations: the stops of White and Black Hispanic individuals, shown in Figure 4. We note that
there are more White individuals stopped (4492) than Black Hispanic individuals (2414). However,
if we look at the arrest distribution (visualized geographically in the second plot) the rate of arrest
for White individuals is lower (12.1%) than for Black Hispanic individuals (19.8%, the highest rate
for any race in the dataset). Given our model we can ask: “If every individual had been White,
7https://github.com/stablemarkets/StopAndFrisk
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Figure 4: How race affects arrest. The above maps show how altering one’s race affects whether or
not they will be arrested, according to the model. The left-most plot shows the distribution of White
and Black Hispanic populations in the stop-and-frisk dataset. The second plot shows the true arrests
for all of the stops. Given our model we can compute whether or not every individual in the dataset
would be arrest had they been white. We show this counterfactual in the third plot. Similarly, we can
compute this counterfactual if everyone had been Black Hispanic, as shown in the fourth plot.
would they have been arrested?”. The answer to this is in the third plot. We see that the overall
number of arrests decreases (from 5659 to 3722). What if every individual had been Black Hispanic?
The fourth plot shows an increase in the number of arrests had individuals been Black Hispanic,
according to the model (from 5659 to 6439). The yellow and purple circles show two regions where
the difference in counterfactual arrest rates is particularly striking. Thus, the model indicates that,
even when everything else in the model is held constant, race has a differential affect on arrest rate
under the (strong) assumptions of the model.
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